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THE FINE ART OF JUDGING: WILLIAM T. ALLEN
BY RONALD J. GILSON*
I feel more than a little conflicted about writing to commemorate
Bill Allen's completion of his term as Chancellor of Delaware.
Economists understand the inefficiencies that result when private and
public benefits diverge: people seek their advantage even though the
public bears more than offsetting costs. That pretty well describes the
dissonance I'm experiencing about this event. The benefit to me of
gaining a good friend as a neighbor, and to the NYU Law School
community from the addition of this remarkable man as a colleague and
teacher, are dwarfed by the cost to the entire corporate law community
from losing one of the finest corporate law judges to grace any bench in
a very long time. Twenty-five years ago Bayless Manning announced the
death of corporate law "as a field of intellectual effort."1 By the sheer
force of his intellect, Bill Allen has given substance to what Manning
then described as "our great empty corporate statutes - towering
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing
nothing but wind."2 Manning blamed corporate law's demise on the
collapse of the nineteenth century notion that the corporation, like
Pinocchio, was to be treated as a "real boy."3 Bill Allen has sought to
rebuild corporate law on a more realistic and intellectually challenging
foundation that recognizes the competing decision makers who contend
for influence behind the corporate veil.
To be sure, Bill Allen found himself in the right place at the right
time. The hostile takeover wave of the 1980s subjected the traditional
structure of corporate law to the equivalent of a stress test. Driven by the
most significant corporate restructuring in history, serious doctrinal cracks
appeared, the most important of which concerned allocating final decision
rights in the face of a hostile tender offer. As a matter of corporate law,
the challenge was to apportion decision responsibilities among directors,
shareholders, and courts. As a matter of social policy, the outcome

Charles J.Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, and Marc and
Eva Stem Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School.
'Bayless Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisalRemedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
2Id.

'See id. at 245-48.
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would determine who governed the largest and most powerful private
institutions in our society.4
Bill Allen's tenure as Chancellor spanned this momentous period.
He became Chancellor in 1985, the year the Delaware Supreme Court
decided Unocal.' This seminal case announced an intermediate standard
of judicial review of defensive tactics - directors had the burden of
proving that such actions were reasonable in relation to the threat posed
by the hostile offer. And this set the agenda for the Court of Chancery
for much of Bill's term. The choice of an intermediate standard which
the trial court would use to distinguish between good and bad defensive
tactics (rather than allocating that decision role either to shareholders or
the board of directors) meant that the court would decide the outcome of
these control contests. Thus, the Court of Chancery was left the task of
not only working out just what proportionality review meant, but also of
providing guidance to the legal and business communities about how the
largest transactions in business history should be conducted. Discussions
of the Court of Chancery's remarkable efforts to rise to the occasion are
familiar by now. On this occasion, I want to focus instead on the art of
judging and the particular style Bill Allen developed.
The Court of Chancery is a peculiar institution for reasons beyond
its sheltering the last remaining Chancellor in the United States. There is
considerable literature about the art of judging, but beginning with Karl
Llewelyn's masterful The Common Law Tradition,6 most of the attention
has been on appellate courts. This emphasis reflects the understandable
intuition that trial courts decide cases, but that appellate courts make the
law. One court focuses on the merits of a particular case, and the other
shapes the rules that will influence the future behavior of a much larger
number of people.
The Court of Chancery is a funny hybrid in that it unavoidably
does both. Consider the spot that Bill Allen and the Vice-Chancellors
found themselves in during the second half of the 1980s. Because of the
high volume of acquisition activity, a large number of transactions were
in the planning stage whenever a new opinion was issued. Planners
promptly reflected a new opinion in pending transactions, and the Court
of Chancery confronted the "next case" on a motion for preliminary
injunction within a matter of weeks. Cases were often resolved under the

4See generallyRonaldJ. Gilson, JustSay No to Whom?,25 WNAKEFoRsTL.REv. 121
(1990) (discussing the justifications for allowing managers to reject hostile tender offers over
the objection of a majority of the shareholders).
-Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
6
KARL N. LLEwELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON: DEcmNo AP'Enis (1960).
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pressure of market forces before the Delaware Supreme Court could hear
an appeal. Thus, the Court of Chancery was, defacto, the court of first
and last resort for many takeover contests and was restructuring corporate
law on the fly. At the same time, the Court of Chancery had to remain
sensitive to the views of a supreme court that was less experienced with
the dynamics of control transactions, especially in this hectic period.
What merits comment - because it goes to the art and craft of a
judge - is how Bill Allen managed this complicated position. On one
hand, he provided guidance to the legal profession and the business
community about how new types of multi-billion dollar transactions
should be conducted and, on the other, he kept the Delaware Supreme
Court at bay so that a coherent body of law could be developed and
maintained. Readers may see in my comments a substantive preference
for the Court of Chancery's view on these matters, as opposed to that of
the Delaware Supreme Court, and that is surely right. However, that is
not the ax I mean to grind today. For now I mean only to praise the
Herculean efforts of Bill and his colleagues.
Two examples serve to illustrate how this fine line was walked.
The first is Bill's practice of delivering lectures on how transactions
should be conducted, even if the transaction whose review provided the
opportunity for the lesson in dicta was not so flawed as to require judicial
intervention. The second is his unsuccessful effort in Time-Warner7 to
preserve the Court of Chancery's takeover jurisdiction from incursion by
the Delaware Supreme Court. Correctly reading the Delaware Supreme
Court's tea leaves, Bill declined to interfere with the transaction but
carefully (too carefully it turned out) crafted the opinion to reach this
result without doing too much damage to the decision-making allocation
emerging from Court of Chancery opinions.
TransactionPlanning Guidance Via Dicta
The tack of providing guidance on how to conduct future
transactions by means of lecture rather than outcome appears quite clearly
in the Chancellor's opinion in In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders
Litigation.8 The opinion ultimately rejected claims that management
manipulated the transaction process to favor its MBO proposal at the
expense of a higher price for shareholders that might have resulted from

7'Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), reprintedin 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 700 (1990).
'No. 9991 (Cons.), 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), reprinted in
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 699 (1989).
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a more even-handed process.' However, the deficiencies in a transaction
process were noted with care:
I am unable to conclude provisionally that the Special
Committee was not motivated throughout to achieve a
transaction, if there was to be one, that offered the assurance
of being the best available transaction from the point of
view of the shareholders.... Rarely will direct evidence of
bad faith

-

admissions or evidence of conspiracy

-

be

available.... [But h]ere, there are aspects that supply a
suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame.
It cannot, for example, be the best practice to have the
interested CEO in effect handpick the members of the
Special Committee .... Nor can it be the best procedure
for him to, in effect, choose special counsel for the
committee ....

It is obvious that no role is more critical

with respect to protection of shareholder interests in these
matters than that of the expert lawyers who guide sometimes
inexperienced directors through the process. A suspicious
mind is made uneasy contemplating the possibilities when
the interested CEO is so active in choosing his adversary."0
FortHoward also provides evidence that the technique worked - i.e.,
that transaction planners took the Chancellor's "advice" seriously.
Skadden Arps represented the Fort Howard Special Committee and could
hardly have relished the opinion's implicit criticism of their advice.
When the firm undertook the same role in the RJR-Nabisco transaction,
the FortHowardadvice was scrupulously followed. In their account of
the transaction in Barbariansat the Gate, Bryan Burrough and John
Helyar explicitly credit this judicial lecture on how to properly conduct
an MBO for the change in conduct."
Such self-conscious attention to influencing the conduct of future
transactions, independent of the case before the court, gives special
meaning to the phrase "mere dicta." In the fast moving environment into
which events thrust the Court of Chancery, traditional common law

91d at *6, reprintedin 14 DE-L. J. CORP. L. at 705.
"Id at *36, reprintedin 14 DEL. . CORP. L. at 719-20. See In re .P. Stevens & Co.
Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988), for a similar lecture.
"BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARANS AT THE GATE THE FALL OF RJR
NABisco 181-82 (1990).
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accretion of precedent was too slow to help. The Chancellor's
instrumental use of dicta, directed explicitly at transaction planners, was
a creative and elegant response to the problem of keeping the law moving
at a pace at least close to that of the market.
ProtectingCourt of Chancery Doctrine
from the Delaware Supreme Court
In Interco, 2 Chancellor Allen laid out with some clarity an
allocation of decision-making authority among shareholders and directors
when confronted with a hostile takeover. Directors were allowed to keep
a poison pill in place while alternatives were investigated but, in the end,
shareholders had the final say over whether to accept the offer.1
Management's job was to carry on the business of the corporation. In
particular, management could exercise its business judgment concerning
whether it was in the best interests of the shareholders to sell important
divisions: the Chancellor declined to enjoin management's proposed sale
of Interco's Ethan Allen division, even if that sale would discourage the
hostile offer.'4 The shareholders' job was to decide whether to accept the
hostile offer: the opinion required that the Interco directors redeem the
pill. 5 Then came Time-Warner.
Assume with me that it was apparent that the Delaware Supreme
Court, one way or the other, would allow Time management to complete
the Warner acquisition even if Paramount was offering Time shareholders
significantly more money for their shares than the post-acquisition value
of the combined companies' shares. How could the transaction be
allowed to proceed without undermining Interco? The Chancellor gave
up some ground in agreeing that Paramount's hostile offer threatened
Time's interest in achieving its long-term strategy of a business
combination with Warner. But he recovered it with his treatment of the
proportionality leg of the Unocal test. The opinion repeatedly
emphasized that Time's defensive tactic consisted solely of implementing
its business plan. 6 The opinion stressed that nothing precluded
Paramount from tendering for the combined Time-Warner other than the
peculiarities of the particular transaction - specifically, the sheer size of

12City

Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).

"Id. at 790-91.
14Id. at 800-01.

"Id. at 803.
"'Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., (1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), reprintedin 15 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 700 (1990).
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such an offer, and the need for regulatory approval of the transfer of
Time's cable franchises.1 7
This may be quite an unusual result. Most business plans, however
implemented, will not deter a hostile offer. If the plan is value creating,
the bidder will continue it after the offer. If not, the bidder will
terminate it after the offer, reducing its bid to reflect the anticipated loss.
To actually protect a long-term strategy typically will require something
more than merely its implementation.
That means a poison pill. And here the Chancellor's opinion
directly tracks Interco. In concluding that the Warner acquisition was
reasonable in relation to the Paramount threat, he stressed that the
defensive aspect of the transaction was self-implementing: "Because of
the timing involved, the board has no need here to rely upon a selfcreated power designed to assure a veto on all changes in control.""8 And
lest anyone miss the point, Chancellor Allen appended footnote 22 to that
sentence: "Thus, in my view, a decision not to redeem a poison pill,
which by definition is a control mechanism and not a device with
independent business purposes, may present [more] distinctive
considerations than those presented in this case."' 9 In Interco, he declined
to enjoin the target's sale of a key division, finding that the sale was a
reasonable response to the claim that the division was undervalued by the
hostile offer, but still required that the target redeem its pill, an outcome
that left the business plan without protection against a hostile offer. In
Time, he declined to enjoin the Warner acquisition, but stressed that
pursuit of that business plan was not protected by a poison pill against a
post-acquisition hostile offer.
This was a very clever doctrinal two-step. Unfortunately, it proved
too clever because the Delaware Supreme Court never seemed to
understand it. The Delaware Supreme Court began its Time opinion by
apparently misreading Interco. Responding to the claim that inadequate
value alone was insufficient to constitute a threat under Unocal,the court,
referring explicitly to "Intercoand its progeny," stated that such a
position represents a fundamental misconception of our
standard of review under Unocal principally because it
would involve the court in substituting its judgment as to
what is a "better" deal for that of a corporation's board of
directors. To the extent that the Court of Chancery has

DEL. . CoRp. L. at 749.
19Md[at 93,284 n.22, reprintedin 15 DEL L CoRP. L. at 749 n.22.

I'Mla
at 93,284, reprintedin 15
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recently done so in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject
such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal
analysis.2 °
The Delaware Supreme Court's understanding of Interco is right to the
extent that the case is about allocating decision making in connection
with a hostile offer. But it is flatly wrong about the parties among whom
Interco chooses. Interco does not substitute the court's judgment of a
better deal for that of the board's. Rather, it prevents the board from
substituting its judgment on that subject for that of the shareholders.
Given the prologue of a confused swipe at Interco, the Delaware
Supreme Court's analysis of Unocal's proportionality leg is especially
perplexing. Chancellor Allen rested his conclusion that Time's response
was proportional on the fact that the acquisition did not foreclose
shareholder choice - no poison pill prevented Paramount from making
a post-acquisition offer. Like Interco, the issue was shareholder choice,
not the Court of Chancery's choice. But despite its misguided
denigration of Interco, the Delaware Supreme Court then essentially
adopted the Chancellor's proportionality analysis: "The Chancellor noted
that the revised agreement and its accompanying safety devices did not
preclude Paramount from making an offer for the combined Time-Warner
company ....Thus, the response was proportionate. We affirm the
Chancellor's rulings as clearly supported by the record."2 1
The two Time-Warner opinions demonstrate Bill's mastery of
another element of the art of judging: a trial court charged with the
responsibility of remaking corporate law protecting the result from a less
sophisticated appellate court. In this case the effort failed, but rarely has
both the attempt and the reason for it appeared so starkly. Indeed, in
time even the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the relative merits of
the two opinions. When the Delaware Supreme Court returned to the
issue of what triggers Revlon in ParamountCommunicationsInc. v. QVC
Networklnc.,'2 it was the Court of Chancery's analysis that stood the test
of time, in both senses of the word.

2

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
(citations omitted)
211d. at 1155.
22637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).

